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Abstract 
 In Marx, the production mode is defined as a social organisation 
mode which is typified by one dominant production model which confers 
significance on the system at large. The prominence of production modes in 
his overall approach provides clues to the identification of the correct 
scientific method of Marxism and, probably, of Marx himself. The main aim 
of this paper is to define this method and to discuss a type of socialist 
revolution which appears feasible in this day and age.  
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Introduction  
 It is not from scientific advancements – Gramsci argued – that we 
are to expect solutions to the issues on the traditional agenda of 
philosophical research. Fresh inputs for philosophical speculation have 
rather come from notions such as ‘social production relations’ and ‘modes 
of production’, which are therefore Marx's paramount contributions to 
science.1  In a well-known 1935 essay weighing the merits and 
                                                          
1 For quite a long time, Marxists used to look upon the value theory as Marx’s most 
important contribution to science. Only when the newly-published second and third books 
of Capital revealed that Marx had tried to reconcile his value theory with the doctrine of 
prices as determined by the interplay of demand and supply did they gain a correct 
appreciation of the importance of the materialist conception of history.  
Comparing Marx’s revolution in social science to the Copernican revolution in astronomy, 
Plechanov maintained that the materialist approach to history was the only true scientific 
method that every social scientist was expected to adopt (see Plechanov 1911, p. 2); Sartre 
argued that «we cannot go beyond Marxism because we have not gone beyond the 
circumstances which engendered it» (Sartre 1960, p. 19); and forty years after him Musto 
wrote that “thanks its unequalled critique of the capitalistic production mode, Marx’s 
approach will remain a milestone in social science unless and until it is proved wrong” 
(2005b, p. 155).  In the estimation of Wright Mills, «no one can think of himself as a social 
thinker if he fails to give due attention to Marx’s theoretical approach» (see Wright Mills 
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shortcomings of Marxian political economy against those of mainstream 
economics, the Polish economist Oskar Lange expressed a comparable view 
when he wrote that the former, while arguably coming short of the latter in 
areas such as pricing and resource allocation, had the superior merit of 
spotlighting the way economic life is organised, the division of society into 
classes and the existence of different modes of production and was 
principally aimed to identify the laws governing the development of human 
society in the long term (see Lange 1935).  
 In a few words, this strong point of Marxian theory can be summed 
up as follows: (a) it highlights a sequence of different production modes that 
arose at various steps in history (the mode of the ancients, feudalism, 
capitalism, etc.) and thereby suggests that capitalism can barely be the last 
link in this chain; (b) it shows that the mechanisms governing the 
development of each production mode obey specific laws and rules and that 
individual behaviour is greatly affected by the way production is organised.2  
 The prominence of production modes in Marx’s overall approach 
provides clues to the identification of the correct scientific method of 
Marxism and, probably, of Marx himself.3  
 The main aim of this paper is to define this method and to discuss a 
type of socialist revolution  which appears feasible in this day and age.  
  
Modes of production in Marx’s approach  
 In Marx, the production mode is defined as a social organisation 
mode which is typified by one dominant production model which confers 
                                                                                                                                                     
1962, p. 7), and Bloom commented that «each great cultural era of the globe seems to be 
fated to live through an absorbing and usually bitter controversy over the merits and 
relevance of the doctrines of Karl Marx» (1943, p. 53).   
Detractors include Brewer, who controverts that Marx’s approach offers few, if any, 
insights into the far-reaching issues with which mainstream economists concern themselves 
and thinks this to explain why they hold him in scant esteem (see Brewer 1995).   
2 Curiously, yet interestingly enough, in the four-square breakdown used by U. Pagano to 
illustrate the four economic organisation models he rates as the most prominent of all 
(Marxian socialism, the rational expectations model, Lange’s 1936 model and Hayek’s 
market economy model) we would expect market socialism to be associated with Hayek, 
but Pagano remarks that despite the traditional contrast between the Marxian and Austrian 
schools, a combination of the two would probably carry us much further (see Pagano 2006, 
p. 116).   
As mentioned before (see, for instance, Jossa 1994a, pp. 94ff.), it strikes us as surprising 
that Hayek never as much as attempted to explain why he thought it necessary to have 
businesses enterprises run by capitalists, rather than by worker-appointed managers. 
3 Unlike O’Boyle, I do not think that the description of history as a sequence of modes of 
production results in downscaling the role of human action (see O’Boyle 2013, p. 1024).    
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significance on the system at large.4  The idea that society is shaped by its 
production methods is rated as Marx’s most pregnant scientific finding (see 
Bloom 1943, p. 58). Stedman Jones (1978, p. 341) rates modes of 
production as «the decisive concept around which the materialist conception 
of history was to crystallize between 1845 and 1847».   
 The relevance of the notion of production modes was first 
emphasised in Engels’s review of the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy: «the proposition that the process of social, political and 
intellectual life is altogether necessitated by the mode of production of 
material life – he argued – was a revolutionary discovery not only for 
economics but also for all historical sciences – and all branches of science 
which are not natural sciences are historical» (see p. 203 in Marx 1859).   
 The notion of production modes is both inextricably intertwined with 
the materialist conception of history and one of its principal constituents and 
corollaries. From the idea that the economic mechanisms governing a 
society are not consciously or wilfully contrived by the people – the core 
assumption behind historical materialism – it follows, by way of corollary, 
that the existing production mode is a direct offshoot of the level of 
development of the productive forces. Moreover, thanks to a distinct focus 
on the production relations prevailing at the corresponding historical stage, 
this notion highlights parallel trends under way in a plurality of countries 
and shows that economic life develops in accordance with laws comparable 
to those of material life.  
  
Production modes and ‘totality’ in Marx’s approach  
 In Marx’s theoretical framework, production modes are closely 
associated with the notion of totality. In the Grundrisse, Marx wrote that 
production, distribution, exchange and consumption are not identical, but 
members of a totality, distinctions within a unity (Marx 1857-58, vol. I, p. 
25), and that no concept, however general, can exist «except as an abstract, 
one-sided relation within an already given, concrete, living whole» (Marx 
1859, p. 189).   
 These and comparable statements may explain the generalised 
assumption that Marxists reject any one-sided descriptions of capitalism and 
prioritise an approach founded on the notion of totality.  
 According to Marcuse, «for Marx, as for Hegel, ‘the truth’ lies only 
in the whole, the ‘negative totality’» (Marcuse 1954, p. 347); and Wolff, 
                                                          
4 The idea that Marx’s concept of modes of production resulted in an epistemological break 
within the traditional approach to the philosophy of history is widely shared.  
For the changes the notion of Marxism underwent over time, see, inter alia, Haupt 1978, 
pp. 115-45.   
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Callari and Roberts (1982) have laid stress on the paramount place of the 
totality notion in Marx’s approach.5  
 On closer analysis, the prominence of the totality notion in Marx's 
approach is associated with his dynamic view of historical development, 
specifically his claim that «the structure of the whole must be conceived 
before any discussion of temporal sequence».   
 In an attempt to help appraise the role of totality in Marx's approach 
and underscore his valuable contribution to science, Veblen argued that 
«taken in detail, the constituent elements of the system are neither novel nor 
iconoclastic, but the system as a whole has an air of originality such as is 
rarely met with among the sciences dealing with any phase of human 
culture». For a similar view, see Bronfenbrenner 1967, p. 625.  
 The reasons why the notion of production modes and totality may 
help shed light on Marx’s dialectical method6 are implied in the description 
                                                          
5 In the estimation of Adorno, it is principally in analyses of bourgeois society that the 
totality notion is found to be particularly rich in valuable insights; MacGregor (1984, p. 
174) held that the idea of capitalism as a living system and an organic whole was one of the 
key elements of the dialectical method that Marx took over from Hegel; Proudhon 
described capitalism as a systematic totality which generates a complex tangle of 
contradictions (see Proudhon 1946, but also Ansart 1969, pp. 159ff.).   
6 The assumption that Marx was always a dialectical reasoner is supported by the following 
passage from Marx’s letter to Kugelman (dated 6 March 1868): «Hegel’s dialectic is the 
basic form of all dialectics, but only after being stripped of its mystical form, and it is 
precisely this which distinguishes my method» (Marx, 1868, p. 544). In fact, Marx also 
wrote: “if ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to 
write two or three sheets making accessible to the common reader the rational aspect of the 
method which Hegel not only discovered but also mystified” (Marx 1858, p 155). As this 
plan was never put into practice, it can barely come as a surprise that Marx’s dialectical 
method is still being construed in a variety of different ways or that Heilbroner has 
dismissed dialectics as «a term without a clear or univocal meaning» (Heilbroner 1980, p. 
28).   
Irrespective of the unmistakable Hegelian colouring of all Marx’s writings, Schumpeter 
warned, to think of Hegelism as the keystone of Marxism would amount to debasing the 
scientific standing of Marx’s overall theoretical edifice. Marx, he added, delighted in 
‘coquetting’ with Hegelian phrasing, but did not go any further (see Schumpeter 1954, p. 
9). Studies aimed to show that Marx gradually scaled down his use of dialectical reasoning 
and that dialectics cannot help us understand Marx include Bernstein 1899 (chap. II), 
Rosenthal 1988 and Bidet 1998 (p. 225). Analytical Marxists rate dialectical reasoning as 
altogether misleading and, hence, barely more helpful than formal logic in constructing a 
social theory (see Meyer 1994, p. 1). Setting the long string of cross-references to Hegel 
(especially his Logic) appearing in the recently published Grundrisse against the sparse 
Hegelian overtones resounding in just a handful footnotes of Capital, Rodolsky argued that 
no academic could dare to address Marxian economics unless he had concerned himself 
earnestly both with Marx's method and its links with Hegel’s (see Rosdolsky 1955, p. 8).  
In a well-reasoned study, Colletti showed that Marx’s dialectical method was not identical 
with Hegel’s (Colletti 1969). What is needed, he added elsewhere (Colletti 1958, pp. 92-
93), is «purging today's Marxism of all the remnants of Hegelian dialectical thinking – not 
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of dialectics as «a theory of both the unity and exclusion of opposites» 
(Ilyenkov 1960, p. VII) and a method which uses the concept of totality as 
tool for determining the truth (Bell 1995, p. 112), as well as in the remark 
that «for Hegel and Marx, the notion of a living organism expresses the 
essence of dialectics in history» (see MacGregor 1984, p. 111).7  
 Hence, it is also possible to argue that the application of the 
dialectical method to economic research thrusts into the foreground «an 
endless intertwining of mutually connected forces, a picture in which 
nothing remains either what, where or as it was, but in which everything 
moves, changes, is in process of formation or dissolution» (Engels, 1891, 
pp. 35-36); in other words, it shows that dialectics is «research into the 
many ways in which entities are internally related» (Ollman 1976, p. 61).8 
 Lenin characterised dialectics as the most intriguing of all 
philosophical issues (see Meyer 1957, p. 19) and «a tool capable of 
disclosing links between one thing and all the others» (op. cit. p. 21),9   
 Marxism draws on Hegel for the theory that reason is in essence 
relational, that is to say that it necessitates a simultaneous focus on 
coexisting antithetical elements – i.e. ‘unity of opposites’. Indeed, Hegel’s 
ideas of reason and ‘the negative’ constitute the celebrated ‘rational kernel’ 
of his dialectical method. For a correct appreciation of the sheer magnitude 
of Hegel's speculative powers it is worth bearing in mind that Hegel was the 
only philosopher who rose to the challenge of offering consistent definitions 
of reason and thought as immaterial, rather than positive processes and even 
of the infinite. All pre-Hegelian philosophers, be they Schelling or Spinoza, 
Leibniz or Descartes, thought of the infinite as what lies beside, above or 
                                                                                                                                                     
of all its dialectical overtones, but just of passages with an idealistic colouring. In other 
words, what needs to be done is not rectifying Marx's theoretical edifice, but just rephrasing 
parts of it in an effort to bring to the fore all its extraordinary complexity» (see, also, Croce 
1899, pp. 4-9, Hyppolite 1969, pp. 300-303, Garaudy 1969, pp. 312-14 and Hofmann 1971, 
pp. 80-84). 
In Althusser 1965 (pp. 18-20) we read that «young Marx was never strictly speaking a 
Hegelian», that he was moderately inspired by Hegel when he wrote the Manuscripts of 
1844, but that by 1845 he had broken free from all Hegelian influence. 
Musto’s intellectual biography of Marx offers an intriguing glimpse into the interrelations 
between Marx and Hegel (see Musto 2011).  
7 Vidoni remarks that dialectical reasoning looms large in Marx’s analyses of organisms, 
their relationship with the environment and their social relations, that is to say in passages 
which address highly complex processes entailing a wealth of interrelations between 
different actors» (see Vidoni 2007, p. 260). 
The Italian poet Giacomo Leopardi argued that non-dialectical thinking «obliterates 
vastness and grandeur and prevents us from grasping the totality of the natural world» (see 
Citati 2010, p. 53). 
8 For views departing from Colletti's, see Severino 1978 and Napoleoni 1985, part III.   
9 On this point, see, also, Bernstein 1899, p. 52.   
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beyond the finite; in other words, as but one extreme of an opposition, a 
unilateral term (Ilyenkov 1960, p. VIII).10 For all that, and irrespective of 
these Hegelian links, dialectics must be construed as the ‘interpenetration of 
opposites’ since this will allow retaining the non-contradiction principle.11  
 This form of dialectical thinking is even observed in a comparatively 
early work such as the Criticism of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843), 
which Screpanti explains as an attack on idealism mounted by Marx in full 
sync with Feuerbach’s rejection of Hegel's hypostases, as an attempt to 
validate the Aristotelian view that the non-contradiction principle is a 
necessary prerequisite for logical thinking, and as Marx’s first attempt to lay 
the foundations for the materialist conception of history (see Screpanti 2011, 
p. 7).  
 These reflections call to mind Gramsci's conception of dialectics. 
«The ability to detect identity in seemingly different things and far-reaching 
diversity behind a seeming identity – Gramsci wrote – is the subtlest, least 
understood, and yet greatest virtue of a critic of ideas or analyst of historical 
evolution» (1975, p.2268).12 Commenting on this passage, E. Finocchiaro 
remarked that «this ability of the critic-historian is dialectical thinking par 
excellence, or dialectics in a narrow and very special sense» (1988, p. 
157).13 14   
  
Marx’s method   
 Coming to the method of Marx and Marxism as originally defined in 
the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, let me 
mention, right from the start, that this text dates from 1857, but did not go to 
press since Marx, rating it as nothing but a fragmentary attempt, refused to 
offer solutions that were not backed up by adequate demonstrations. Upon 
its appearance in 1903, the Preface showed that by the autumn of 1875 
Marx had fleshed out the methodological foundations of his economic 
theory to the full and that the continuing debate over the correct 
                                                          
10 In Hegel’s dialectical approach, «the individual terms are inseparably conjoined» (Hegel 
1831, p. 14).   
11 For a demonstration that Marx’s investigation of truth is consistent with the basics of the 
Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction, see Schaff 1974, pp. 26ff. and 171ff.   
12 For Gramsci's use of dialectics, see Bobbio 1958, where Gramsci is shown to have used 
both the form of dialectical thinking that focuses on mutual interactions between opposed 
elements and the form using the thesis - antithesis - synthesis triad.   
13 As my approach may actually entail attempts at attenuation and reconciliation of the type 
that Naville holds to distort Marx’s masterly dialectical method and reduce it to a pale cast 
for use by more or less eclectic philosophers (see Naville 1948, p. 12), let me re-emphasise 
my pledge to be always true to the spirit of Marx’s approach.    
14 For the subjects touched upon in this section, see Habermas 1969, chap. IV.   
European Scientific Journal November 2016 edition vol.12, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
26 
interpretation of his work is just to be blamed on the fact that his method 
remained hidden in the folds of Capital.   
 As is well known, Marx held that contrary to all appearances, the 
procedure that starts from the real and concrete actually «proves false» 
(Marx 1857-58, vol. I, p. 26) because within the process of thinking the 
concrete appears «as a process of concentration and, as a result, not as a 
point of departure» (op. cit., p. 27). Accordingly, he recommended 
beginning with the abstract on the assumption that «the method of rising 
from the abstract to the concrete is the only way in which thought 
appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind» (op. 
cit., p. 27).15 This begs the question if beginning with the abstract means 
using as starting points the simplest possible categories, for example 
commodities and value, or complex categories such as the mode of 
production.    
 As far as I can see, the use of abstractions as a starting point does not 
necessitate starting out from the simplest categories; on the contrary, more 
often than not the correct procedure is to start from such an abstract key 
notion of Marxism as the mode of production.16    
 In Marx 1857 (p. 188) and Marx 1857-58 (vol. I, p. 26) we read:  
                                                          
15 Analysing Marx's methodological approach to the study of political economy, Althusser 
acutely remarked that there were two methods, one starting from the real itself, the other 
from abstractions. With reference to the Grundrisse (Marx 1857-58, p. 27), he asked 
himself which of these two methods was the correct one and drew the following conclusion: 
«it seems to be correct to start with the real and concrete ... , but on closer inspection it is 
clear that this is false. The second «is manifestly the correct scientific method» (Althusser 
& Balibar 1965, p. 94). 
Not unlike him, Rosa Luxemburg was persuaded that Marx tilted far more strongly towards 
moving from abstract to concrete, but she also spelt out that this procedure was antithetical 
to the European mode of speculation which in her opinion had been revived by the 
European Social Democrats and by Lenin’s party (see Negt 1979, pp. 329-30).  
This view is also shared by Aron (1979, pp. 159-60).   
The reflections just developed should not make us forget that Marx consistently contrasted 
the Kantian-Feuerbachian approach with Hegel’s. The former, which he rejected, theorised 
the separation of the ideal from the real and looked upon reality as irrational. In a letter to 
his father written in November 1837, he set this approach against Hegel’s thesis that «the 
real is rational and the rational is real» (see Cingoli 2001, pp. 44-45).   
16 In a recently published review of the new Mega2 edition of Marx’s works, Marcello 
Musto tries to make out what picture of Marx emerges from this new historical-critical 
edition of work. His conclusion is that Marx appears to be a polymorphous thinker and that 
the differences between this picture and that traditionally painted by Marx commentators 
(be they supporters or critics) are clear evidence that Marxian research still has a long way 
to go (Musto 2011, pp. 215 e 216).    
The aim of this paper is just to analyse the method that emerges from Marx's 1857 Preface 
and the Grundrisse and, based on relevant passages, attempt to show that despite Marx's 
failure to offer conclusive methodological indications, the Marxist method is one that starts 
out from determined abstractions, specifically from the mode of production.   
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 «It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with 
the real precondition», In economics, therefore, it seems correct to begin, by 
way of example, «with the population, which is the foundation and the 
subject of the entire social act of production.» On closer analysis, though, he 
continues, «this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, 
for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are 
an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest, 
e.g. wage labour, capital, etc. The latter in turn presuppose exchange, 
division of labour, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage 
labour, prices, etc.».    
 Ultimately, Marx’s line of reasoning leads up to the conclusion that 
any attempt to work out a satisfactory definition of a notion requires close 
cross-references to the totality that notion is part of.17    
 «The simplest economic category, say e.g. exchange value – Marx 
wrote (1857, p. 189 and 1857-58, pp. 27-28) – presupposes population; 
moreover, a population producing in specific relations, as well as a certain 
kind of family or commune, or state, etc. It can never exist other than as an 
abstract, one-sided relation within an already given, concrete, living whole».    
 Further on (see Marx 1857, p. 191 and Marx 1857-58, vol. I, p. 30), 
Marx offered the following clarifications: «Although the simplest category 
may have existed historically before the more concrete, it can achieve its full 
(intensive and extensive) development precisely in a combined form of 
society, while the more concrete category was more fully developed in a less 
developed form of society. Labour seems a quite simple category. The 
conception of labour in this general form – as labour as such – is also 
immeasurably old. Nevertheless, when it is economically conceived in this 
simplicity, ‘labour’ is as modern a category, as are the relations which create 
this simple abstraction».   
 Another relevant passage runs as follows: «Bourgeois society is the 
most developed and the most complex historic organisation of production. 
The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its 
structure, thereby also allow insights into the structure and the relations of 
production of all the vanished social formations» (Marx 1857, p. 193 and 
Marx 1857-58, p. 32-3).18 
                                                          
17 A critical perusal of the 1857 Preface shows that Marx not only considered the option of 
moving from the abstract to the concrete, but finally described this procedure as the only 
properly scientific method. Consequently, Fineschi argues, whereas the method he had been 
using that far had been as mystical in essence as Hegel’s logic, from that time on it became 
not mystical tout court, but just to the extent it purported to reflect the way reality is 
created» (Fineschi 2006, p. 47).   
18 In the opinion of Vinci (2008, p. 56), the method which starts from the concrete, extracts 
from it general abstract ideas and re-examines the concrete in the light of the latter can be 
compared to a Copernican revolution. As the concrete starting point is fixed within 
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 My line of reasoning so far goes to clarify that the correct procedure 
is generally one that starts from the whole, i.e. from totality or the abstract 
notion of the production mode, and then moves downward in order to bring 
to the fore the individual constituents of this whole.    
 This conclusion is backed up by the importance Marx ascribed to the 
notion of determined abstractions. From Marx’s perspective, the severest 
shortcomings of political economy, his favourite field of study, were to be 
blamed on the practice of economists to focus on the concrete based on 
abstractions which were unrelated to a specified production mode and, 
hence, not ‘determined’.   
 In his review of the Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy Engels wrote that Marx adopted «the only correct mode of 
conceptual evolution» because he divested Hegel’s dialectical method of all 
its idealistic echoes. The method that Marx worked out for his critique of 
political economy – he added – was «hardly less significant than the basic 
materialist conception» (Engels 1859, p. 208).19  
 This statement of Engels's requires a reasoned analysis (see Carver 
1984).  
 As mentioned before, the key element of Marx’s dialectical method 
is a focus on totality, the production mode, and we also know that he 
criticised earlier economists for failing to work out the notion of modes of 
production and for a naive conviction that capitalism was bound to last 
forever.    
 The logical thread followed by Meek in a 1956 study leads up to 
basically the same conclusion. According to this author, not unlike other 
great theoreticians Marx starts out from what Schumpeter termed the 
‘vision’ of the economic process. The reason why Marx defers the analysis 
of details is that «to quite large an extent they are dependent upon the nature 
of the model-builder’s vision» and upon «the nature of the general method 
of analysis which he decides to adopt» (Meek 1956, p. 277). Lenin also – he 
argued – pointed out that Marx’s first step was to select from all social 
                                                                                                                                                     
historical time, he explains, the abstractions that Marx draws from it are determined, i.e. 
specifically applicable to capitalistic society. In a capitalistic society, a determined 
abstraction such as abstract labour is deduced from a concrete phenomenon, i.e. the existing 
labour organisation model, and is used to bring to the foreground an antithesis: in this case 
the contrast between a natural physical phenomenon such as concrete labour and a social 
phenomenon such as abstract labour.   
Let me mention that the concrete-to-abstract procedure (which he termed the ‘analytical’ 
method) was ascribed by Hegel to seventeenth century economists and the opposite, 
abstract/simple-to-concrete/complex procedure (termed the ‘synthetic’ method) to 
eighteenth century economists.   
19 Moving from abstract to concrete is a method whereby thought is made to reflect material 
reality, not (as Hegel claimed) to create it.   
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relations the ‘production relations’ because it is these that are the basic and 
prime relations that determine all the others (op. cit., p. 279).   
 Hence, it is clear that also from Meek’s perspective the proper 
Marxist method is one that starts out from an abstract notion such as the 
production mode, proceeds to focus on simpler categories and finally reverts 
to the concrete – the «synthesis of many determinations».20   
 With reference to Marx’s position in and around 1957, Musto 
remarks:   
 «Unlike evolutionary theorists, who used to describe simple 
organisms first and then to progress to more and more complex ones along a 
simplistic ascending ladder of sorts, Marx chose to proceed in the opposite 
direction, and the resulting, much more complex method led him to theorise 
a notion of history as the sequence of different modes of production. … 
Ultimately, it was the bourgeois economic system that offered valuable 
clues to a correct appreciation of the salient traits of the economic systems 
of earlier ages» (Musto 2011, pp.139-40).  
 In short, Marx held it necessary to take as a starting point determined 
abstractions founded on the production mode.   
 In this connection, it is worth emphasising that Marx rated 
production modes and capitalism as abstract notions  which offered the 
preliminary knowledge required to analyse, by way of example, a concrete 
production note such as British capitalism in the nineteenth century. The 
capitalistic mode of production, Fineschi explains (2006, p. 9), is «a 
sophisticated abstract reconstruction of the working mode of bourgeois 
society in a given period of history» and the far from simple concept of the 
production mode is therefore itself an abstract notion.   
  
A different approach 
 The way the method of Marx and Marxism is being analysed in this 
paper has little in common with the traditional approach.  
 A recurring question is whether Marx’s recommendation to begin 
with the abstract and move to the concrete entails taking as a starting point 
simple notions and working out complex notions based on them. «The 
concrete – Marx wrote (1857, p. 189 and 1857-58, p. 27) – is concrete 
because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the 
diverse». The conclusion implied in this statement is that abstract notions 
are simple.  
                                                          
20 In Lukàcs 1976 we read: «Abstraction is never fragmentary, that is to say no single 
element is ever presented, by way of abstraction, as segregated from the rest. Rather, it is 
the whole sector of the economy that is presented as an abstract realm in which the 
temporary exclusion of precise links between broader categories allows the categories that 
come into focus to act themselves out to the full» (Lukàcs 1976, p. 290).   
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 Further on in the same text, Marx made it clear that a simple concept 
such as population is an abstraction and that the division of labour, money, 
value, which are ‘individual moments’, are general, hence abstract 
determinations.  
 These and similar passages induced Marx commentators to argue 
that whenever we take as starting points abstract notions we have to begin 
with simple concepts and, from them, rise to the level of the concrete 
(which, let this be repeated, Marx held to be complex).   
 As far as I can see, this wrong conclusion can both be traced to 
Marx’s failure to define or discuss such starting abstractions and to the 
undeniable fact that the method he proposed in 1857 (rising from abstract to 
concrete) was reversed but two years later, in Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, where Marx recommended «rising from the particular to 
the general» (see Marx 1859, p. 3).  
 An additional explanation for the misconception that the method 
upheld in the 1857 Preface is rising from the particular to the general, from 
simple to complex, may be the use of a simple notion such as commodities 
as the starting point for Capital.   
 On closer analysis, however, those who reached this wrong 
conclusion failed to give due consideration to Marx's explicit statement, in 
both the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and Capital, that 
the use of a simple starting concept in these works was necessitated by his 
decision to follow a sequence exactly opposite to that typical of mainstream 
scientific research.  
 «It would be unfeasible and wrong – he argued – to let the economic 
categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they 
were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their 
relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the 
opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds 
to historical development» (Marx 1857, p. 196 and Marx, 1857-58, p. 35). 
 Reverting to this point years later, Marx added: «Of course, the 
method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry» (see Marx, 
1873, p. 44). 
 To tell the truth, the Grundrisse do include a passage which 
recommends beginning with the simple and proceeding to the complex, and 
this may obviously account for the above-mentioned misconception.  
 The passage concerned runs as follows: «The economists of the 
seventeenth century, e.g., always begin with the living whole, with 
population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always conclude by 
discovering through analysis a small number of determined, abstract, 
general relations such as division of labour, money, value, etc. As soon as 
these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and 
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abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended from the 
simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to 
the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market. The 
latter is obviously the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete 
because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the 
diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of 
concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the 
point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for 
observation and conception. Along the first path the full conception was 
evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second, the abstract 
determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of 
thought» (Marx 1857-58, p. 27).   
 Although the first and most obvious objection that comes to mind is 
that the passage concerned features in a work which was never published, it 
is probably more appropriate to admit that Marx’s approach to this 
methodological point is contradictory.   
 In part, the blame for this misconception can also be laid on a 
passage from the already mentioned 1859 review of the Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, in which Engels (irrespective of Marx's 
declared intention to reverse the traditional method) spelt out that Marx, 
contrary to his own recommendation to use as starting points logical 
categories, made use of the traditional method on the assumption that «the 
point where this history begins must also be the starting point of the train of 
thought and its further progress will be simply the reflection, in abstract and 
theoretically consistent form, of the historical course» (Engels 1959, p. 208).  
Still another explanation for the wrong assumption that the abstract starting 
point must be a simple concept is probably the general belief that abstract 
notions are simple by their very nature.  
 This assumption is implied, for instance, in the following excerpt 
from Wetter 1848 (p. 386): «By unity of analysis and synthesis we do not 
mean that the first step must be an analytical procedure designed to identify 
the simpler categories by way of abstraction and that the second step should 
solely be their concentration into a synthesis. Actually, analysis and 
synthesis must be inextricably intertwined over the whole process  which 
starts from abstract determinations and rises to the concrete. The process 
whereby the categories rise from abstract to concrete (synthesis) requires an 
ongoing effort at differentiation within each of the less abstract categories 
(analysis) and, lastly, an additional synthesis to work out a less abstract 
category».21   
                                                          
21 The same misconception underlies the following excerpt from Ilyenkov 1960 (p. 7): 
«Each of the definitions forming part of a system naturally reflects only a part, a fragment, 
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 Let me re-emphasise that quite a lot of Marxists rated the simple-to-
complex procedure as the correct scientific method on the assumption that 
this was the method that Marx and Engels themselves recommended. In a 
much praised monograph on Marx’s method, Dal Pra wrote that «our mind 
reconstructs its representation of reality by combining together a number of 
simple determinations» (Dal Pra 1972, p. 316) and that the procedure 
entailing the rise from simple to concrete must consequently be looked upon 
as the appropriate scientific method.   
 Discussing a point analysed in Capital, Lukàcs wrote that this key 
problem alone was sufficient evidence that the method of rising from 
individual sub-processes to the all-embracing process required not only a 
major effort at abstraction consistent with our modern thought processes, but 
the attempt to transcend certain limitations of abstract ideas in an effort to 
gain a correct appreciation of totality (see Lukàcs 1976, p. 303). Here 
Lukàcs seems to assume that the notion of totality, that is to say the 
production mode, is not an abstract concept, but a material reality. As a 
result, he argues that economic analysis must take as its point of departure a 
simple concept such as the notion of value (see Lukàcs 1976, pp. 290-96).   
  Much in the same vein, Marković maintained that the technical and 
methodological innovation introduced within the framework of Marx's 
conception of history was a method which starts from simple universal 
abstract notions such as commodities, labour, money, capital, surplus value, 
etc., and rises from these to aspects of material reality (see Marković 1969, 
p. 133); Jahn and Noske (1980) argued that the Marxist method was to «rise 
from simpler to ever more complex aspects of the object of our inquiry»; 
and Fineschi (2006 (p. 136) described Marx's research method as positing 
the starting category, that is to say commodities, with all the determinations 
highlighted before» (see, also, op. cit., pp. 139-46).   
  
Marx and socialism   
 In Abendroth 1858 (p. 77), Marx and Engels are said to have 
consistently striven to come to terms with the awareness that the actions of 
people in society, though autonomously devised, tend to evolve in directions 
other than those that had been – and could be – anticipated and end up by 
shaping the subsequent path of mankind (see Abendroth 1958, p. 77). From 
Abendroth’s perspective, this means that unless and until this situation is 
reversed, the aim of making men masters of their history will not be 
achieved.  
                                                                                                                                                     
and records only one of the particular moments of concrete reality in its entirety. Hence, 
when it is considered separately from the others, it is abstract».   
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 As Abendroth held this to be the core problem behind Marxist 
thought, he concluded that Marxism was as timeless as that issue (op. cit., 
pp. 78-79). For my part, I fully agree with him on this point since I hold that 
Marxism as a theory of revolution has lost none of its topicality.  
 In an analysis of this point, Bloch argued that based on a misreading 
of Marx, scholars addressing Marxian theory from a merely empirical angle 
of view end up by expunging two supposedly utopian visions of reality 
which actually draw their relevance from this utopian colouring: firstly the 
ideal and, secondly, the ultimately utopian component of the former. And 
while they do so on the assumption that these visions lack concreteness – he 
continued – it remains that both of them are integral components of 
Marxism and will continue to be so for good (see Bloch 1968, p. 209).   
 Day after day, ever more people are developing an awareness that 
capitalism is a catastrophe from which humankind is unable to break free. 
An often-quoted argument has it that unless and until critics of free 
enterprise capitalism succeed in working out a suitable alternative other than 
a better regulated free market capitalist system or state capitalism (the 
traditional socialist system), it is highly unlikely that people will join to 
form a social movement poised to dismantle capitalism. Although this 
criticism is widely shared, it is fair to admit that the alarming tendency to 
stage protests without offering viable alternative options is probably the 
main vice of democratic citizenship today (see Bodei 2013, p. 163).  
 In my opinion, at this stage of history we have realised that shedding 
the fetters of capitalism without recourse to a violent revolution is no 
unrealistic prospect, i.e. that this goal can be attained through the peaceful 
enforcement of resolutions passed in parliament. Indeed, the findings 
reported in the producer cooperative literature since the appearance of 
Ward’s seminal 1958 article have offered convincing evidence that a system 
of worker-controlled firms, though evidently no all-cure, is sure to work at 
high levels of efficiency. 
 The question arising at this point is: what did Marx mean by 
socialism? 
 To answer this question, it is worth bearing in mind that Marx 
always refused to write recipes for what he termed the ‘cook-shops of the 
future’ and left it with ‘cooks’ to work out solutions to the problems he had 
been pointing up.  
 In the estimation of the Webbs, in matters of post-revolutionary 
economic policy Marxist theory is of no avail since Marx’s theoretical 
approach, for all its depth and breadth, offers no indications concerning the 
way to address issues likely to emerge within a socialist economy. In 
support of this view they mentioned Lenin's explicit statement, following his 
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seizure of power, that he did not know of any single socialist who had made 
it his task to investigate these issues. 
 The resulting theoretical void has been severely criticised by more 
than one author. Hutchinson, for instance, has emphasised that Marx and 
Engels did not realise that proclaiming themselves revolutionaries while 
failing to offer clues, however slight, to the possible organisational model of 
the proposed alternative society was, to say the least, an attitude of utter 
irresponsibility (see Hutchinson 1978, p. 197).   
 For my part, I wish to point out that Marx and Engels, while 
doubtless failing to provide details of the organisation model of the future, 
spelt out in bold letters that the characteristics of the socialist model of 
society were to proceed from the successful supersession of all the 
contradictions they had pointed up in capitalism.  
 In this connection, let me mention that as Marx particularly 
emphasised two basic contradictions within the world in which we live (the 
plan-versus-market and capital-versus-labour oppositions), it is possible to 
envisage two production systems capable of guaranteeing the transition to 
communism: a system of publicly run and centrally planned enterprises and 
a system of workers’ councils, that is to say a system of producer 
cooperatives run by the workers themselves.22   
 Time and again, Settembrini emphasised that one of the two 
alternative transition scenarios sketched by Marx was a peaceful road to the 
establishment of a democratic form of evolutionary socialism (see, also 
Avineri 1968). At the other end of the spectrum, Bakunin described Marx as 
                                                          
22 Originally, Marx and Engels believed that the precondition for the establishment of a 
socialist system was centralising all powers firmly in the hands of the State. It was the Paris 
Commune that induced them to reconsider this stance and to think of socialism as mainly 
connoted by democratic production processes (see Screpanti 2007, pp. 145-46). This 
conclusion is prompted by a passage from The Civil War in France, dated 1871, where 
Marx wrote that the Paris Commune (which «supplied the republic with the basis of really 
democratic institutions» and «the political form, at last discovered, under which to work out 
the economic emancipation of labour»; see Marx 1871, p. 85) had shattered the power of 
the modern state (op. cit., pp. 82 and 83) to the point where the old centralized government 
had been obliged to give way to the self-government of producers even in the provinces 
(op. cit., p. 82).   
In contrast, Lichtheim (1965, p. 228) has argued that late in life Marx abandoned his 
temporary infatuation with the utopianism of the Paris Commune and reverted to statist 
stances. This opinion is shared by Lehning, who rates the 1871 text of The Civil War in 
France as that of a writer who was basically a non-Marxist, that is to say as a clear sign that 
Marx went through a spell of non-statist thinking (see Lehning 1969, p. 431).   
Some Hegelian Marxists hold that Marx's theoretical speculation powers began to falter 
from his fortieth year of age onwards, specifically from the time he wrote the Grundrisse 
and published the first and second editions of Book I of Capital and the Preface to its 
French edition, down to the second edition, in 1879, of the Notes on Adolph Wagner's 
‘Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie’ (see Backhaus 1997, p. 297 and Haug 2005, p. 293).   
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a tyrannical centralizer who did extol the triumph of equality, but held on to 
the naive belief that this goal could be achieved through state action and the 
dictatorial rule of a possibly strong central government. On closer analysis, 
Marx’s disregard for the cook-shops of the future gives us scope for arguing 
that either production system can have a place within his theoretical 
framework.  
 In the light of this, the question why Marx should deserve more 
credit as a theoretician of rational planning than an advocate of self-
management and participative democracy is little more than a purely 
academic query (see Screpanti 2007, p. 146).   
 The call for the handover of factories to workers dates back to the 
Chartist movement in Britain and was translated into practice – albeit in 
non-democratic forms – upon the establishment of a self-managed firm 
system in Yugoslavia. Its roots are in the notion that means of production 
are to be socialised.    
 In point of fact, self-management theorists draw a clear-cut 
distinction between nationalisation and socialisation. As the former, they 
claim, entails the retention of production means by the State and only the 
latter vests self-management powers in workers, this only is able to cancel 
the separation between the ‘two factors of production’ that Marx used to 
denounce. Indeed, Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune made a strong 
case for the self-government of factories by producers, i.e. free associations 
of those directly engaged in production.   
 As far as central planning, the first of the two above-mentioned 
systems, is concerned, the model that Marx had in mind had little, if 
anything, in common with the top-down Soviet-type planning model that 
history has meanwhile proved wrong.  
 The theoretical categories underlying twentieth century socialism 
were principally defined by Lenin and then further developed by Stalin. And 
as the scant esteem in which Marx is held by many is doubtless to be blamed 
on his association with the USSR,  today, following the collapse of the 
despotic state socialism model, the need to reconsider non-statist alternative 
options to liberal-democratic capitalism is becoming more urgent than 
ever.23  
 Although experience has taught that centralised planning is no 
solution, considering that Marxist policies today are moving further and 
further away from the principles of the Bolshevik model, this does not 
necessitate consigning socialism or Marxism to oblivion.   
                                                          
23 This is the rationale behind the argument that contrary to all appearances, the balance in 
Marx’s polemic against Proudhon on this point is ultimately tilting in favour of the latter.   
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 In the light of the fact that economic cooperation theorists have 
fleshed out an option to capitalism which would both ensure efficiency and 
not require central planning as a matter of course, there is scope for arguing 
that Marx has happily survived a spell of near-hibernation since his name 
will no longer be associated with the oppressive bureaucratic system of the 
past century.24    
 As Marxists clearly distinguish between socialism and communism 
and Marx and Engels themselves deemed it impossible to abolish markets at 
the earlier post-capitalist stages, a democratic firm system which vests 
management powers in workers can be said to be fully compatible with 
Marx's theoretical approach even if it fails to abolish markets.   
 According to Bernstein, the historical roots of revisionism are an 
aversion to the ‘welfare state’ and a supportive attitude towards the world of 
cooperation (see Bernstein 1918, p. 23 and Angel 1975, pp. 117-18). For my 
part, I wish to add that this new approach to socialism is probably in full 
harmony with Marxism.   
 Conversely, I do not share Bernstein’s view that class interests ebb 
away in direct proportion to advancements in democracy. 
 Those who hold that Marx's conception of socialism is difficult to 
reconcile with markets are hereby referred to a ‘methodological’ indication 
owed principally to Gramsci, i.e. an encouragement to reword any tenets of 
Marx (even basic ones) whenever this should appear to be necessitated by 
novel insights or historical developments. Such a practice would be 
perfectly in line with Derrida's argument that Marxism «remains at once 
indispensable and structurally insufficient» and should therefore be 
«transformed and adapted to new conditions and to a new thinking of the 
ideological» (see Derrida 1993, p. 78) and with Gramsci's own observation 
that the canons of historical materialism are applicable to history only post 
factum and should never become an obstacle to the analysis of the future 
(see Gramsci 1914-18, pp. 153-55 and Cacciatore 1987, pp. 255-56).25    
                                                          
24 Lunghini and Cavallaro report an interesting statement by Keynes which runs as follows: 
«The Republic of my imagination lies on the extreme left of the celestial spheres. Yet all 
the same I feel that my true home, so long as they offer a room and a floor, is with the 
Liberals» (Keynes 1926b, p. 260). In their opinion, this quote is clear evidence that in 1926 
even a person who thought of himself as an extreme radical rejected the system that had 
been established in post-revolutionary Russia as an inacceptable organisational model.    
An often-heard objection is that those Marxists who call into question the labour theory of 
value and the Soviet model have generally failed to make it clear what they hold to be the 
true essence of Marxism (see, for instance, Rodinson 1969, pp. 9-13, who tries to reverse 
this tendency by offering his own definition of Marxism).   
25 Bronfenbrenner traces the continuing topicality of Marx’s thought in this day and age to a 
generalised feeling of dissatisfaction, rather than to its inherent scientific merits (see 
Bronfenbrenner 1970, pp. 137- 40). 
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The place of revolution in Marx’s approach    
 In full sync with Sartre's argument that we cannot go beyond 
Marxism because «we have not gone beyond the circumstances which 
engendered it» (Sartre 1960, p. 19),26 in the light of the recent theorisation 
of a form of revolution which is both possible and desirable in our 
contemporary world it is possible to argue that Marx’s theory of revolution 
has lost none of its topicality.  
 «Marx's philosophy – Petrović has argued  (1975, p. 40) – is both 
speculation on the essence of being and speculation on revolution,27 but not 
speculation on being plus revolution. On the contrary, thanks to its essence 
as speculation on being, it is at the same time (not ‘additionally’) 
speculation on revolution - and, consequently, on socialism».  
 The topicality of Marx is supported by a ‘Marx-Renaissance’ of 
sorts, that is to say by a wealth of Marx studies that have recently appeared 
in the literature and bear witness to a continuing concern of scholars with 
Marxian theory.28   
 As is well known, in the minds of economists the term revolution 
(i.e. the break with the existing social model) is to be construed as the 
introduction of a new mode of production.29 This was doubtless the view of 
                                                          
26 Similarly, forty years after him Musto argued that “thanks to Marx's unequalled critique 
of the capitalistic production mode, his approach will be a milestone in social science 
unless and until it is proved wrong” (2005b, p. 155). On this point,  see, also, Kellner 1995, 
p. 26. 
27 In a 2006 paper, Roberts set out to refute the view of Marx as a theoretician of capitalism 
(which he thinks is widely shared) and to offer instead a – purportedly new – picture of 
Marx as the theoretician of the anti-capitalist revolution. In fact, this paper just shows its 
author forgetful of the fact that the characterisation of Marxism as a theory of revolution 
goes back to Lukàcs (1923, p. 320) and has been concordantly upheld by scholars ever 
since (see Jossa 2006).    
Agnes Heller, a disciple of Lukàcs, (1976, p. 135) , has argued that identifying some codex 
of socialist morality in Marx (the codex of communism) is essential if we are to gain a 
correct appreciation of his approach and work towards developing a form of ‘living 
Marxism’.  
Without denying Marx's status as a theoretician of revolution, Wallerstein, Przeworski and 
others have remarked that trade unionists resolved to endorse capitalism on realising that 
the battle for the protection of worker interests within that system was the best option open 
to the working class (see, for instance, Przeworski, 1995, p. 169). In this connection, 
however, it is worth emphasising that purging Marxism of its revolutionary kernel might 
arguably lead to an academically correct picture of Marx, but would deprive his approach of 
its unmistakable sting. 
28 The claim that Marxism is on the wane is widely shared. One of the first authors to 
challenge this view by close reference to contemporary events was Struve (1899). 
29 Marx’s definition of revolution is a clear and simple notion. In Kautsky 1902 (pp. 168) 
we read that the main difference between reformism and revolution is not the use of 
violence in one case and its rejection in the other. (To tell the truth, on occasion he did 
suggest the exact opposite – see, for instance, Kautsky 1892, pp. 65-77). In Kautsky’s 
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Marx, the great theoretician of production modes and the way they arise, 
grow and pass away;30 but it is also shared by anyone prepared to admit that 
there are many possible modes of production and, specifically, that 
socialism is an organisational model which differs from capitalism and, 
consequently, a new production mode.31    
 It is worth emphasising that the concept of revolution as the 
establishment of a new production mode is so central to Marx’s thought as 
to necessitate the argument that Marxism is a theory of revolution (see 
Lukàcs 1922, p. 320). From this, it follows that a) the criterion against 
which we are to test the validity of Marxism is how far the establishment of 
a genuine socialist system will prove to be practicable; and that b) the 
qualification of ‘Marxist’ should be restricted to those who maintain that a 
socialist or communist order can be established in practice (and consistently 
                                                                                                                                                     
opinion, the salient characteristic of a revolution was «the conquest of political power by a 
new class (op. cit., p. 169). Authors endorsing the opposite view, i.e. the idea of non-
violence as passivity and of violence as an essential component of any revolution, include, 
by way of example, Settembrini (1973, p. vii), Geary (1974, pp. 92-93) and Roemer (2008, 
p.14). 
Notwithstanding the evidence that Marx and Kautsky proposed clear, simple and ultimately 
concordant definitions of revolution, Simone Weil argued that «among all those who still 
persist in talking about revolution, there are perhaps not two who attach the same content to 
the term» (see Weil 1995, p.32). The definition of revolution on which Sartori dwells at 
length in a 2015 study (see Sartori 2015, pp. 15-35) differs greatly from the one suggested 
in this paper.   
The view of revolution as the introduction of a new production mode and the clarification 
that revolution does not necessarily entail the use of violence go to explain that 
revolutionary aspirations have nothing to do with the ‘lyric age’ discussed by Milan 
Kundera in his charming 1973 book entitled Life is Elsewhere (1973). Central to Kundera’s 
book is the idea that the desire for a revolution is the typical attitude of the inexperienced 
young and is born of a ‘lyric’ disposition of mind. According to Kundera, it arises in people 
who are unable to act and give themselves up to dreams of a better life, seeking refuge in 
dreams, in lyric life, in poetry. Lastly, the links between revolution and violence lead 
Kundera to claim that police action, poetry and revolution have in common much more than 
is generally assumed. On closer analysis, though, Kundera’s reflections, for all their 
acumen, have no bearing on Marx’s view of revolution as the replacement of the existing 
production mode with a different one.   
30 «The scientific standing of Marxism – Gruppi argues (1970, p. 340) – rests entirely on 
the emphasis laid on the historically determined essence of economic laws, on the dynamic 
evolution of economic systems and the inextricable nexus between economic and political-
sociological analysis.   
31 The idea that Marxism is a theory of revolution and that revolution is the mission of the 
proletariat leads me to argue, in the wake of Lukàcs, that Marxism is the expression of the 
class  consciousness of the proletariat (Watnick 1962, p. 161).   
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with Marx’s approach).32 From this, it follows that those who do not believe 
in revolution cannot be characterised as Marxists.33     
 As Marxist thought draws nourishment from the prospect of social 
change, any attempt to deny its revolutionary essence will result in 
distorting its theoretical foundations. To the extent the twenty-first century 
proves to be an age of long-term social stability, all Marxist movements are 
likely to be perceived as irrelevant and to whither away; if, conversely, no 
stability should be achieved, social thought will necessarily be influenced by 
Marxist ideas or by any other ideas that should appear to be further 
developments of Marxism.34 
  
The roots of Marx's revolutionary vision  
 To establish why the worldview of this great Trier-born thinker is so 
radically revolutionary, we may turn to a well-reasoned 1961 book in which 
Tucker showed that Marx had chosen revolution and communism even 
before commencing work on his material conception of history. 
 The view that Marx’s idea of revolution has its underpinning in 
historical materialism is generally traced to the following passage from the 
Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: 
 “In the real production of their existence men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material 
                                                          
32 In a speech delivered on Marx’s grave, Engels said: «Marx was before all else a 
revolutionist. His real mission in life was to contribute, in one way or another, to the 
overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into being; 
to contribute to the liberation of the modern proletariat, which he was the first to make 
conscious of the conditions of its emancipation» (see Mehring 1918, p. 530).   
33 In a well-known paper by Holloway, a disciple of Lukàcs and Adorno, we read that the 
problem with the traditional concept of revolution «is perhaps not that it aims too high, but 
that it aims too low. The notion of capturing positions of power, whether it be governmental 
power or more dispersed positions of power, in society, misses the point that the aim of the 
revolution is to dissolve relations of power, to create a society based on the mutual 
recognition of people’s dignity” (Holloway 2002, p. 20). On closer analysis, Holloway’s 
argument is to be rejected for two main reasons. Firstly, it fails to construe revolution as a 
change in the production mode; secondly, it fails to point out that a new production mode 
would amount to a proper revolution even where its effect should be, not to overthrow the 
existing power structure altogether, but just to bring about a more equitable distribution of 
power.   
As Korsch put it, all the deformations that Marxism underwent at the time of the 2nd 
International can be summarised in «one all-inclusive formulation: a unified general theory 
of social revolution was changed into a critique of the bourgeois economic order, the 
bourgeois State» (see Korsch 1923, p. 59).  
34 In the opinion of one of the founders of analytical Marxism, far from being a theory of 
revolution Marxism is actually a critical approach to the analysis of capitalistic society 
which offers no key to its transformation (see Elster 1985, pp. 513-31).  
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forces of production.” The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which 
arises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite 
forms of social consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the 
material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing 
relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal 
terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have 
operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these 
relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution» 
(Marx 1859, p. 5).   
 To refute the view that the roots of Marx's communism lie in this 
passage, Tucker provides evidence that Marx became a revolutionary and a 
communist around 1843, due to the influence of Moses Hess, and 
specifically on realising that alienation is principally caused by the way 
economic life is organised in civil society.  
 Feuerbach had shown that ‘productive activity’ was a distinctive 
feature and attribute of the human species, he argued, but the Feuerbachian 
theorist Moses Hess had reached the conclusion that egotistic drives 
prevented man in the modern world from producing cooperatively and that 
capitalistic society was therefore in a state of ‘perversion’.  As suggested by 
Tucker, Moses Hess was also greatly influenced by Proudhon, the originator 
of a form of ‘philosophical communism’  which commingled the ideals of 
communism with Hegel’s philosophy of history. From Proudhon, he wrote, 
Hess principally took over the notion of property as theft, the founding stone 
of his Feuerbachian theory of alienation.    
 These reflections induced Tucker to suggest that Marx grew into a 
communist when he embraced the philosophical communism of Hess and its 
Hegelian core idea of alienation, but that he wove into his view of 
communism a notion unknown to Hess, i.e. the idea of the proletariat as the 
instigator of a new social order.   
 It was the idea of class struggle as the interpretative key of history – 
he maintained – that led Marx to distance himself from Hegel. According to 
Sabine (1937, p. 588), Marx took from Hegel the idea of nations as the true 
actors in history (a notion which was actually but loosely connected to 
Hegel's overall system), replaced the thesis of the struggle between 
antagonistic nations with the notion of a struggle between social classes. In 
this way, he stripped Hegelism of its political overtones ... and turned it into 
a powerful form of social radicalism.    
 From Tucker we also learn that the idea of the proletariat as the 
instigator of a new social order derives from a very influential book written 
by Lorenz von Stein. In Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right, he argued, which was written at the end of 1843, Marx is seen to 
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have undergone a major process of change that leads him to replace «the 
image of self-alienated humanity» with that of the proletariat as the 
«suffering expression of alienated man in revolt against his condition» 
within the existing economic system. Quoting Marx's saying that just «as 
philosophy finds in the proletariat its material weapon», so «the proletariat 
finds its spiritual weapon in philosophy», he emphasised that Marx 
developed «this singular philosophical conception of the proletariat» under 
the influence of Lorenz von Stein's book.  
 In point of fact, von Stein was a conservative eager to refute the 
socialist and communist ideas circulating his day, but his book helped 
disseminate the idea that the proletariat, the new property-less class that had 
made its debut on the historical world scene, was, by its very nature, a 
revolutionary class engaged in a struggle against capital.    
 In the Philosophy of Right Hegel had warned that a dangerous 
process resulting in the concentration of disproportionate wealth in just a 
few hands was threatening to unleash a rabble of paupers, though he added 
that poverty itself was not enough to generate a revolt of the masses. To 
create a rabble, he argued, it takes «joined to poverty, a disposition of mind, 
an inner indignation against the rich.»  Even the description of the 
proletariat as a rabble – Tucker argues, derives from von Stein's book, with 
which Marx's writings of the middle forties «show a minute textual 
familiarity» (Tucker 1961, p. 115).  
 Yet, he noted, von Stein’s contention that communism is the class 
ideology of the proletariat was countered by Marx in a matter antithetical to 
that of Hess.  Whereas Hess criticised von Stein for explaining communism 
as the response of a single class to its material deprivation, Marx looked 
upon the proletariat as the class called upon to free humanity from the evils 
of capitalistic alienation.    
 These reflections show that the initial step in Marx’s progress 
towards communism was a Hegelian form of ‘philosophical communism’35 
which had as its main, and probably permanent underpinning the idea of 
alienation.36   
                                                          
35 As far as the influence of Hegel on Marx is concerned, I am prepared to agree both with 
Tucker and with Berlin’s argument (1963, pp. 120-21) that Marx’s immediate successors 
tended to understate the ascendancy of Hegel without considering that when Marx’s 
theoretical framework is represented in line with Marx's own perception of himself as a 
rigorous scientist concerned with the investigation of truth, but without a concomitant focus 
on the unifying model that helped mould his approach, his approach ends up by being 
splintered into a myriad loosely linked intuitions.    
36 For a different description of Marx's road from liberalism to socialism, see Cornu 1955.   
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 Let me add that the acme of Marx’s development into a 
revolutionary coincided with the development of his materialist approach to 
history and the associated idea of modes of production.37    
 In due time, however, Marx reconsidered his one-time beliefs and 
spoke out for a peaceful transition to socialism. With reference to the 
description of universal suffrage as one of the main goals the proletariat was 
to strive for, there are some who point out that even in such an early work as 
the Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx described the takeover of the 
proletariat as a victory in the battle for democracy (see Avineri 1968) and 
that Capital includes passages underscoring the importance of Factory Acts 
and the fact that many British parliaments passed resolutions favourable to 
workers, rather than their employers (see Sidoti 1987, p. 280).  
 1867, the year when the Second Reform Act enfranchised working 
men in the upper income brackets, marks a watershed of sorts, in terms that 
Marx began to envisage a peaceful transition to socialism. In this 
connection, Lichtheim remarks (1865, pp. 120-21) that The Civil War in 
France, written in 1871, includes passages which show Marx upholding 
ultra-democratic views that call to mind Proudhon, his traditional enemy. 38    
 However, as a result of the continuing influence of the educational 
background that made him a communist when still a young man, Marx 
never completely discarded the idea that the new order might have to be 
established by violent means.    
  
Conclusion    
 The prominence of production modes in Marx’s overall approach 
offers clues to the identification of the correct scientific method of Marxism 
and, probably, of Marx himself. Identifying both this method and a model of 
socialism feasible in this day and age are the two main aims of this paper.   
In Tosel 1996 (p. 147) we read that following the gigantic, yet incomplete 
effort to merge the high points of Western thought (Hegel + Ricardo + 
French Jacobinism) into a critically contrived synthesis, Marxism 
deteriorated into an orthodox creed that has doubtless helped socialise and 
politicise workers, but has failed to teach them how to secure a hegemonic 
position in economic life. Now that economic cooperative theorists have 
                                                          
37 According to Tucker (1961, p. 172), «mature Marxism was the baby grown to adulthood» 
and it was therefore «perfectly proper to speak of the mature doctrine in terms applicable to 
Marxism». 
38 The turn of British Marxists to reformism at the end of the nineteenth century has often 
been traced to a rapid pace of economic growth. According to Lichtheim, this explanation is 
barely convincing since due to a downward trend in Britain's overseas trade money wages 
hardly rose in those years and continued to stagnate even during the subsequent upswing of 
the economy (see Lichtheim 1965, pp. 207-08).   
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fleshed out an alternative option to capitalism  which is sure to work at high 
levels of efficiency, it is possible to argue that Marx has happily survived a 
spell of near-hibernation since his name will no longer be associated with 
the oppressive bureaucratic system prevailing in the past century.    
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